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In Strickland v. Washington,' the Supreme Court articulated a 
two-part standard for evaluating a defendant's Sixth Amendment claim 
that he did not receive tlie effective assistance of counsel at his crimi- 
nal trial. To establish constitutional ineffectiveness of trial counsel 
under Strickland, a defendant must prove first that he did not receive 
reasonably competent assistance, and second, that but for the deficient 
performance of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.2 
The Supreme Court has also held that there is a constitutional 
right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal in criminal cases3 
However, that right arises out of the Due Process Clause, not the Sixth 
1. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
2. Id at 687. 
3. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). 
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A~nendrnent.~ The Court has yet to determine the standard for evaluat- 
ing claims that the right to effective assistance of appellate counsel has 
been denied. Should the Strickland v. Washington Sixth Amendment 
test be applied to appellate counsel, or should some other test be ap- 
plied, for example, a traditional due process test? If Strickland is ap- 
plied, should it be applied in the same way to appellate counsel as it is 
to trial counsel? Every United States Circuit Court of Appeals has 
applied the Strickland test to appellate counsel,5 but none has carefully 
analyzed the pr~blem.~ 
Clearly there are significant differences between the functions 
performed by trial and appellate counsel that might call for a different 
standard.' Additionally, the difference between the trial and appellate 
4. Id. at 402-05. See discussion in9a Part IILA. 
5. United States v. Victoria, 876 F.2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1989); Abdurrahman v. 
Henderson, 897 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1990); Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1987); 
Griffin v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1985); Schwander v. Blackbum, 750 F.2d 494, 
501-02 (5th Cir. 1985); Bransford v. Brown, 806 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1986); Gray v. Greer, 
800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986); Blackmon v. White, 825 F.2d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1987); 
United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1986); Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 
(10th Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775, 780 (11th Cir. 1984). 
6. The Ninth Circuit is the only court to offer any reason for applying the Strickland 
standard to appellate counsel. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1989). However, it 
offered no analysis of the very complex issue. Thus, in Miller, the court's entire statement 
on the subject is as follows: 
We review claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel according to the 
standard set out in Strickland v. Washington [citation omitted]. United States v. 
Birtle [citation omitted]. See also Penson v. Ohio [citation omitted] (holding that 
where a defendant has been, actually or constructively denied the assistance of ap- 
pellate counsel altogether, the Strickland standard does not apply and prejudice is 
presumed; the implication is that Strickland does apply where counsel is present 
but ineffective). 
Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1986), the 
same court offered a different, but equally conclusory and inadequate statement of its rea- 
sons. There, it interpreted the Strickland Court's statement that its "principles governing 
ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct 
appeal or in motions for a new trial" (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697) to mean that 
Strickland's analysis applied to counsel's performance in each of these forums. Birtle, 792 
F.2d at 847. It seems clear that this is a misinterpretation, and that the Court was in reality 
indicating that its Strickland standard was applicable regardless of which forum was being 
used to entertain the claim of ineffective assistance. Whether correct or not however, the 
Ninth Circuit did not fully analyze the issue. 
7. See infra Parts IV.A.1. and IV.A.2. 
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forums might require a different ~tandard.~ For example, the more 
important role played by the facts and by the client at trial might call 
for a more deferential inquiry into trial counsel's performance than the 
inquiry into appellate counsel's perf~rmance.~ Moreover, a finding of 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel has a substantially greater impact on 
finality than does a finding of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel 
because of the greater factual complexity of trial ineffectiveness claims, 
the more extensive procedures required to resolve those claims, and the 
drastic remedy - reversal of a criminal conviction - required for 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel but not for ineffectiveness of appellate 
counsel. lo 
As this article concludes, under a due process analysis, Strickland's 
"reasonable competence" standard" should apply to appellate counsel. 
However, the application of that standard in evaluating the performance 
of appellate counsel should be substantially different fiom its applica- 
tion to trial counsel. Thus, fiom a functional analysis of the role of 
appellate coun~el,'~ "reasonable competence" should require counsel to 
perform several basic appellate functions. These include taking appro- 
priate steps to gain access to the appellate court, securing and review- 
ing the record in the lower court, and performing legal research.I3 
With respect to appellate counsel's duty to select effectively the 
issues to be raised on appeal, we conclude that Strickland's "reasonable 
competence" standard should be applied with much less deference to 
8. See discussion inza Part N.B. 
9. See discussion inza Part 1V.B. 
10. See discus:jion inza Part 1V.B. 
11 .  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. This standard is not without its critics. See, e.g., 
Vivian Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths - a Dead 
End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1986); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of 
"Counsel" in the Skth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433 (1993). 
However, critique of that standard is beyond the scope of this article. This article 
does not take issue with the reasonable competence standard formulated by the Supreme 
Court for evaluating the constitutional effectiveness of trial counsel; it analyzes the applica- 
tion of that standard to appellate counsel. 
12. See B N C ~  A. Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of 
Counsel, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1053 (1980) (applying a functional analysis to the right to 
effective assistance of trial counsel). 
13. See infra Part V.A. 
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counsel than that mandated by the Strickland Court. Moreover, because 
virtually all federal constitutional evaluation of appellate counsel's 
performance occurs in the context of federal habeas corpus review of 
state appellate counsel, Strickland's requirement of a showing of preju- 
dice should not be applicable to claims of appellate ineffectiveness.I4 
The current practice of finding ineffectiveness only where an omitted 
issue would have succeeded in the state appellate courts requires the 
federal courts to predict the reviewability and probable disposition of 
state law issues in the state courts, a gross federal intrusion into state 
process beyond that ordinarily permitted in the operation of the federal 
courts' corrective role. This same intrusion could be avoided without 
the expenditure of substantial additional judicial resources by remand- 
ing a case to the state courts once the federal court determines that the 
omitted issue is of sufficient merit to warrant the state court's consid- 
eration. Requiring the reviewing federal court to determine whether 
there was prejudice in the state courts would conflict with the Supreme 
Court's now well-established, restrictive view of the habeaus corpus 
court's role in reviewing state  conviction^.'^ 
Part I1 of this article closely examines the Supreme Court's deci- 
sion in Strickland v. Washington, as it applies to effective assistance of 
trial counsel. Part 111 analyzes the constitutional origin and current 
status of the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. Part IV 
discusses the functional differences between trial and appellate counsel, 
the differences in the two forums, and the different effect that a find- 
ing of ineffectiveness of counsel at trial or on appeal has on finality. 
Part V formulates a standard to govern ineffectiveness of appellate 
counsel claims that incorporates Strickland's "reasonable competence" 
standard, but applies that standard differently with respect to appellate 
counsel. It also rejects Strickland's prejudice requirement. 
14. See infa Part V.B. 
15. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860 (1993); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717-19 (1993). 
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A. Factual Background 
In Strickland v. Washington, l6 the Court reviewed a claim of inef- 
fectiveness of trial counsel during the sentencing phase of a death 
penalty case. Washington had gone on a crime spree that included 
three murders and several robberies." He surrendered, confessed to 
one of the murders, and then, against his lawyer's advice, confessed to 
the two others.'' He pled guilty to all charges and rejected his 
lawyer's advicr: to request an advisory sentencing jury at the sentencing 
phase of the pi:oceeding.19 
Counsel did little to prepare for sentencing. He decided instead to 
appeal to the sentencing court's well-known favorable disposition to- 
ward those defendants who plead guilty." Counse1,met with Washing- 
ton and spoke by telephone with Washington's wife and mother. How- 
ever, he did not follow up on this one unsuccessful attempt to meet 
with them in person.21 Furthermore, he did not seek out any character 
witnesses because of his sense of "hopelessness'' about the case and 
because he believed it would be better tactically to rely on the plea 
colloquy for facts about Washington's character.22 In essence, 
counsel's strategy was to avoid exposing Washington to negative rebut- 
tal proof by declining to put on any proof. Using similar strategy, he 
also did not request a probation report because he believed it would 
16. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
17. Id at 67162. 
18. Id at 672. 
19. Id 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 672-73. 
22. Id at 673. According to the Court, "[tlhat decision reflected trial counsel's sense 
of hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of respondent's confessions to the 
gruesome crimes." hi It also reflected counsel's decision to rely on the plea colloquy for 
such evidence; the colloquy had been sufficient and the decision to forgo the presentation of 
additional evidence prevented the State from cross-examining respondent and putting on 
psychiatric proof o f  its own. Id 
5 
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prove more detrimental than helpful.u However, counsel did succeed 
in having some evidence excluded that he thought was damaging, in- 
cluding the defendant's criminal rec0rd.2~ 
Counsel's sentencing strategy was thus to rely on the trial judge's 
remarks at the plea proceeding where the judge said that he had great 
respect for defendants who own up to their crimes.* Counsel argued: 
(1) that Washington's remorse and acceptance of responsibility justified 
sparing him from the death penalty; (2) that he had no significant 
criminal history; and (3) that he committed the crimes under extreme 
mental or emotional stress due to his inability to support his family?6 
Nevertheless, the trial judge found several aggravating circumstances 
for each of the three murders and no mitigating circumstances. There- 
fore, the judge sentenced Washington to death on each of the three 
counts of murder?' 
B. State Appellate and Collateral Proceedings 
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the convictions and sentences 
on direct appeal?* Washington then sought state collateral relief 
claiming, inter alia, that he had been deprived of the effective assis- 
tance of counsel based on counsel's failure to investigate and develop 
character evidence in mitigation of his ~entence.2~ The Circuit Court 
of Dade County denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court af- 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 673-74. 
27. Id. at 675. 
28. Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658 @la 1978). 
29. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675. This claim was based on counsel's failure to (1) 
move for a continuance to prepare for sentence; (2) request a psychiatric rep?% (3) investi- 
gate and present character witnesses; (4) seek a presentencing investigation report; (5) present 
meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge; and (6) investigate the medical examiner's 
reports or cross-examine the medical experts concerning the causes of deaths. Id. at 675. 
The respondent submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors and relatives stating that 
they would have testified if asked; and a psychiatric report and a psychologist's report stat- 
ing that he was "chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic dilemma" Id. 
at 675-76. 
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firmed:' holding that Washington had "failed . . . to make a prima 
facie showing of [either] substantial deficiency or possible preju- 
,931 dice . . . . 
C. Habeas Corpus Proceedings 
A petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus based on ineffective 
representation was denied.32 The district court held that although trial 
counsel had rnade errors in failing to investigate mitigating evidence 
further, Washington had suffered no prejudice since he would have 
received a death sentence in any event.33 The Fifth Circuit affirmed in 
part and vacated in part.34 It formulated a different analysis and stan- 
dard for judging ineffectiveness claims and remanded the case to the 
district court with instructions to apply that standard to the facts.35 
Rehearing en banc was 
On rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuie7 analyzed the case 
under an entirely different standard.38 It held that the Sixth Arnend- 
ment right to counsel entitles a criminal defendant to "counsel reason- 
ably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance giv- 
en the totality of the circum~tances."~~ The court explicitly recognized 
a duty to investigate and noted that "the amount of pretrial investiga- 
tion that is reasonable defies precise rnea~urement."~' Nevertheless, the 
court attempted to establish some guidelines for measuring the scope of 
that duty. Thus, the court held that where there is only one plausible 
defense, counsel must conduct a "reasonably substantial investigation" 
that includes "an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, 
30. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1981). 
31. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 676, 678. 
32. Id. at 679. 
33. Id. at 678-79. 
34. Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 
35. Id. 
36. Washington v. Strickland, 679 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 
37. Between the issuance of the panel decision and rehearing en banc, the Eleventh 
Circuit was created and retained jurisdiction of the case. 
38. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (Former 5th Cir. 1982). 
39. Id. at 1250. 
40. Id. at 1251. 
Heinonline - -  97 W. Va. L. Rev. 8 1994-1995 
19941 EFFEC-TNE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE C O W S E L  9 
pleadings and laws involved."41 If there is more than one plausible 
line of defense, counsel should substantially investigate each one before 
choosing which one to rely 0n.4~ Strategic choices based on such in- 
vestigation "will seldom if ever" be found ineffe~tive.4~ 
Failure substantially to investigate each plausible line of defense 
may not necessarily be ineffective, although counsel may not exclude 
defenses for other than strategic reasons. Limitations of time and mon- 
ey, information fiom the client, and the strength of the prosecution's 
case are dl relevant ~onsiderations.~" 
Under the Eleventh Circuit's scheme, reasonable assumptions and 
reasonable choices made after considering the totality of the circum- 
stances are entitled to substantial deference:' Factors relevant to de- 
termining "reasonableness" include: (1) the attorney's experience; (2) 
the inconsistency of pursued and abandoned lines of defense; and (3) 
the potential for prejudice fiom taking an abandoned line of defen~e."~ 
With respect to prejudice, the court held that a defendant must 
demonstrate that counsel's errors "resulted in actual and substantial 
disadvantage to the course of his defense.'*' Upon such a showing, 
reversal would be required unless the prosecution demonstrated beyond 
a reasonable doubt that counsel's deficient performance was harm- 
less." After articulating this standard, the ~leventh Circuit reversed 
and remanded the case to the district court for application of this stan- 
dard.4' The State petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court to re- 
view the Eleventh Circuit's decision, and the petition was granted." 
41. Id. at 1252-53. 
42. Id. at 1254. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 1257-58. 
45. Id. at 1255. 
46. Id at 1256-57 n.23. 
47. Id. at 1262. 
48. Id. at 1260-62. 
49. Id at 1243. 
50. 462 U.S. 1103 (1983). 
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D. The Suprerne Court Decision 
1. The Majority Opinion 
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor~' .the Supreme Court 
reversed." It held that Washington's right to effective assistance of 
counsel had not been ~iolated.'~ Emphasizing that the underlying pur- 
pose of the Sixth Amendment requirement of effective assistance is "to 
insure a fair trialTS4 the Court explained that, "the benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct 
so undermined. the proper functioning of the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just re~ult."'~ 
Rejecting the Eleventh Circuit's formulation of elaborate guidelines 
to cover all cases, the court articulated a simple two-part test for inef- 
fectiveness claims.56 First, the defendant must demonstrate that his 
attorney's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonable- 
ne~s."'~ Second., there must be a showing that there existed a "reason- 
able probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different."s8 
As to the fxst prong:' the Court held that the standard for deter- 
mining an attorney's performance is that of reasonably effective assis- 
tance under ccprevailing professional norms."60 A defendant must show 
51. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion was joined by six justices, including Chief 
Justice Burger and .lustices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. In a separate 
opinion, Justice Brennan joined the Court's opinion, but dissented from its judgment on the 
ground that "the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment!' 
StricWand, 466 U.S. at 701. Justice Marshall dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 706. See 
discussion infia Par1 II.D.2. 
52. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 701. 
53. Id at 700-01. 
54. Id. at 686. 
55. Id 
56. Id at 687. 
57. Id. at 688. 
58. Id at 694. 
59. In adopting this standard, the Court relied on its own prior decision in McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), as well as the consensus of the federal courts. 
60. 466 U.S. at 688. 
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specific acts or omissions by counsel which, viewed from the perspec- 
tive of counsel at trial, fall below the standard of reasonable profes- 
sional assi~tance.~' 
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court explicitly refused 
to enumerate specific guidelines, or to compose a checklist for judging 
attorney ~ompetence.~~' The Court held that, "no particular set of de- 
tailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the 
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legit- 
imate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defen- 
d ~ t . " ~ ~  Moreover, such a set of rules would interfere with the inde- 
pendence of counsel and could distract counsel from vigorous advoca- 
~ y . ~ ~  Instead, the Court relied on "the legal profession's maintenance 
of a standard sufficient to justifl the law's presumption that counsel 
will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the [Sixth] Arnend- 
ment  envision^."^' 
Central to the Court's holding was a strong presumption of reason- 
ably competent assistance - decisions or actions taken by counsel 
should be presumed to have been ~trategic.~~ Such a presumption is 
required since "there are countless ways to provide effective assistance 
in any given case."67 Moreover, according to the Court, the absence 
of such a presumption would inevitably lead to "intrusive post-trial 
inquiry"68 into the quality of representation, which would in turn en- 
courage proliferation of ineffectiveness claims, require an increased 
number of second trials, result in a diminution in counsel's willingness 
to serve, and "undermine the trust between attorney and client."69 
61. Id. at 690. 
62. Id. at 688. 
63. Id. at 688-89. 
64. Id. at 689. 
65. Id. at 688. 
66. Id. at 689. 
67. Id. Nevertheless, the Court recognized certain basic duties: the duty of loyalty, the 
duty to advocate the defendant's cause, the duty to consult with the defendant, the duty to 
inform, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and the duty "to bring to bear such skill and 
knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process." Id. at 688. 
68. Id. at 690. 
69. Id. Not all commentators are convinced that these results are really likely to occur. 
See, e.g., Berger, supra note 11, at 82. Indeed, the unrealistically low fees paid to assigned 
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As to the: requirement of prejudice, the Court distinguished prior 
decisions dealing with the deprivation of counsel, where no showing of 
prejudice is req~ired.~' According to the Court, in ineffectiveness cas- 
es, a showing of prejudice is necessary because (1) the government is 
not responsible for and hence not able to prevent attorney  error^;^' (2) 
attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are just as likely to be 
harmless as prejudicial; and (3) representation is an art, and an act or 
omission that is considered unprofessional in one setting may be 
"sound or even brilliant" in another.72 
Finally, the Court advised that the lower courts need not evaluate 
counsel's performance before addressing the question of prejudice. "If 
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack 
of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course 
should be followed."73 
2. The Other Opinions 
Justice Brennan concurred in part and dissented in part.74 He 
agreed with the Court's articulation of the standard for judging ineffec- 
tiveness claims because he believed that that standard "will both pro- 
counsel are more likely to impact on the diligence of the defense bar than accurate prescrip- 
tions about the basic components of effective criminal representation. On the other hand, 
O'Connor's refusal to formulate a checklist may not have been wrong. Because of the vast 
importaxe of the facts at trial, the kind of checklist that could have been adopted by the 
Court, such as the ABA's Standards Relating to the Defense Function, that could be appli- 
cable to all criminal cases, would likely be so general as to be barely helpful. 
70. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
71. But see Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: 
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 65-74 (1991) (arguing that the 
prosecutor's obligation to do justice requires that he or she assist in preventing errors by 
defense counsel). 
72. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. 
73. Id at 697. This focus on outcome is consistent with the Court's harmless error 
jurisprudence, in which it has increasingly focused on the reliability of the determination of 
guilt rather than on procedural fairness. See, e.g., Brecht, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). The im- 
portance of this announcement by the Supreme Court cannot be overstated; the absence of 
prejudice is the most frequent basis for dismissing claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 
See infra text acconlpanying notes 185-86. 
74. See supra note 51. 
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vide helpful guidance to courts considering claims of actual ineffective- 
ness of counsel and also permit those courts to continue their efforts to 
achieve progressive development of this area of the law."75 He also 
stated his belief that the standards "are sufficiently precise to permit 
meaningful distinctions between those attorney derelictions that deprive 
defendants of their constitutional rights and those that do not; at the 
same time, the standards are ~ ~ c i e n t l y  flexible to accommodate the 
wide variety of situations giving rise to claims of this kind."76 
Justice Marshall dissented, disagreeing with both the performance 
standard and the prejudice req~irement.'~ According to Justice Mar- 
shall, the standard of "reasonable competence" is so vague that it is 
either meaningless or would permit too much variation in the courts.78 
For example, he questioned whether "reasonable competence" referred 
to a reasonably competent retained or assigned la& and whether the 
standard of performance would change to reflect different standards in 
different parts of the country.79 He also disagreed with the majority's 
assertion that uniform standards were impossible to formulate. Accept- 
ing counsel's "wide latitudey' for strategic decision-making, Justice 
Marshall suggested that much of the work involved in trial preparation 
- bail applications, client communication, objecting at trial, and filing 
a notice of appeal - could be the subject of uniform  standard^.'^ Fi- 
nally, Justice Marshall predicted that the court's refusal to formulate 
such standards "will stunt the development of constitutional doctrine .in 
this area."" 
With respect to the requirement of prejudice, Justice Marshall 
stressed the difficulty of making an evaluation of prejudice from a 
record created by ineffective counsel.82 In addition, he rejected the 
75. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 702. 
76. Id. at 703. 
77. Id. at 707. 
78. Id. Justice Marshall stated, "[tlo tell lawyers and the lower c o h  that counsel for 
a criminal defendant must behave 'reasonably' and must act like 'a reasonably competent 
attorney,'. . . is to tell them nothing." Id. at 707-08 (citation omitted). 
79. Id. at 708. 
80. Id. at 709. 
81. Id. 
82. As Justice Marshall explained: a 
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majority's attempt to interpret the Sixth Amendment guarantee of ef- 
fective assistarice as a protection only against conviction of the inno- 
cent, stressing that the guarantee "also functions to ensure that convic- 
tions are obtained only through fundamentally fair procedures": 
The majority contends that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a 
manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was rep- 
resented by a manifestly ineffective attorney. I cannot agree. Every defen- 
dant is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and consci- 
entiously advocated by an able lawyer. A proceeding in which the defen- 
dant does not receive meaningful assistance in meeting the forces of the 
State does not, in my opinion, constitute due pro~ess.~' 
Accordingly, Justice Marshall would have held that, "a showing 
that the perforrnance of a defendant's lawyer departed fiom profession- 
ally prescribed standards requires a new trial regardless of whether the 
defendant suffkred demonstrable prejudice thereb~."'~ Finally, Justice 
Marshall rejected the majority's presumption of reasonable competence, 
characterizing it as merely an attempt to avoid having to resolve inef- 
fectiveness clai~ms.~~ 
mt is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in 
which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had 
been competent. Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by 
good defense counsel. On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a 
reviewing court confidently to ascertain how the government's evidence and argu- 
ments would have stood up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, 
well-prepared lawyer. The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are 
exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the defendant may be 
missing fiom the record precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel. 
Id. at 710. 
83. Id. at 711. 
84. Id. at 712. 
85. Id. Justice Marshall also rejected what he viewed as the majority's attempt to 
avoid relitigation of claims rejected under other, previously formulated standards, by suggest- 
ing that its standard was not different from other, earlier standards. As he concluded: "Noth- 
ing the majority says can relieve lower courts that hitherto have been using standards more 
tolerant of ineffectual advocacy of their obligation to scrutinize all claims, old as well as 
new, under the principles laid down today." Id. at 714-15. 
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A. Constitutional Foundation 
There has been longstanding confusion about the constitutional 
source for the rights afforded an appellant in a criminal case. The right 
to appeal is not mentioned in the Constitution. And, although the issue 
is far fiom clear, the Court has never explicitly held that the Due 
Process Clause requires or does not require appellate review in criminal 
These complexities have been reflected in the Supreme Court's 
decisions addressing the scope of the right to counsel on appeal. Be- 
ginning in 1963, in Douglas v. Calfornia, without any discussion of 
whether or not there is a Constitutional right to appeal, the Supreme 
Court held that there is a right to counsel on an appeal as of right 
guaranteed by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.88 
In Douglas, the Court examined a California rule of criminal pro- 
cedure authorizhg state appellate courts to review a trial record to 
determine whether appointment of appellate counsel would be advanta- 
geous to the defendant or the court itself." If appointment would not 
86. See, e.g., Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Ap- 
peal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503 (1992) (suggesting that it is time to re-evaluate the constitu- 
tional status of the right to appeal); Alex S. Ellerson, Note, The Right to Appeal and Appel- 
late Procedural Reform, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 373, 377-78 (1991) (arguing that there is a 
constitutional right to appeal); Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Reme- 
dies, 61 U W .  CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (1994) (expressing "some sympathy" for the argument that 
there is a right to appeal, but doubting that the current Supreme Court would so hold). 
Resolution of the issue of whether there is a constitutional right to appeal in crirni- 
nal cases is beyond the scope of this article. In any event, the Supreme Court has clearly 
held that where a state has created a right to appeal, an appellant has certain due process 
rights, including the right to counsel (Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)), the right 
to the effective assistance of counsel (Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)), and the right 
to equal protection of the laws (Id. at 403). In none of these decisions has the Court ad- 
dressed the constitutional status of a criminal appeal. 
87. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
88. Id at 357. See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 402-03. 
89. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355. 
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be beneficial to either of them, no counsel would be appointed.g0 
Speaking implicitly in the fundamental fairness language of due process 
analysis, the Court held that if a state afforded a statutory right to 
appeal, it was required to appoint counsel for all indigent appellants to 
"make. that appeal more than a 'meaningless ritual. ""' 
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas compared the right to a 
free transcript on appeal, which was established in Grz$n v. IlinoisYg2 
to the right to assistance of counsel and concluded that the denial of 
either was the same - "discrimination against the indigent."g3 Justice 
Harlan, relying on due process grounds rather than equal protection, 
dissented and concluded that California's practice was not fundamental- 
ly unfair.94 
Three years later, in Anders v. California,gs the Court outlined the 
procedure required for appointed counsel wishing to withdraw from a 
frivolous appeal.96 In doing so, the Court refised to uphold 
California's procedures, which permitted assigned counsel to withdraw 
simply by advising the court that the appeal had no merit; that is, 
without requiring the court to conclude that the appeal was indeed 
frivolous. In its holding, the Court employed both equal protection 
and due process lang~age.~' 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 358. 
92. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
93. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355. 
94. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
95. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
96. The Court defined the procedure as follows: 
mf counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination 
of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That re- 
quest must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record 
that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel's brief should be fur- 
nished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the 
court - not counsel - then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceed- 
ings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. 
Id. at 744. 
97. The Court stated: "The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair 
process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf 
of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae." Id at 744. 
Heinonline - -  97 W. Va. L. Rev. 16 1994-1995 
19941 EFFECTWE ASSIST'CE OF APPELLATE COWSEL 17 
Next, in Ross v. M~fitt;~ the Court upheld a state's denial of ap- 
pointment of counsel on discretionary review. The Court held that 
fundamental fairness did not require counsel at that stage of a criminal 
case." 
Finally, in Evitts v. Lucey,loO decided in 1984, the Court extend- 
ed the right to counsel on appeal to include the right to effective assis- 
tance of co~nsel.'~' In doing so, it confronted directly the "seeming 
ambiguity" about whether Douglas, Anders, and Ross were based on 
equal protection or on fundamental fairness principles.'02 , - 
In Evitts, the Court affirmed the reversal of an order dismissing an 
appeal for counsel's failure to file a "statement of appeal," as required 
by Kentucky's court rules.lo3 The Court began its decision by noting 
that the case presented the "intersection of two lines of cases'y104 - 
those cases holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a crimi- 
nal appellant certain minimum safeguards necessary to make the appeal 
"'adequate and effe~tive,'"'~~ and those cases holding that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel at trial comprehends the right to effective 
assistance of counsel.lo6 
In recognizing the right to effective assistance of counsel on ap- 
peal, however, the Court emphasized that the right is a due process 
right; that is, one based on fundamental fairness secured entirely and 
directly by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
rather than through the Equal Protection Clause or by incorporation of 
the Sixth Amendment.'07 The Court relied on its prior statement in 
98. 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
99. Id. at 605. 
100. 469 U.S. 387 (1984). 
101. Id at 405. 
102. Id. at 402. 
103. Id. at 405. The state rule required that appellants serve with the record on appeal 
a "statement of appealn that contained the names of appellants and appellees, counsel, the 
trial judge, the date of judgment, the date of notice of appeal, and other miscellaneous in- 
formation. Id. at 389. 
104. Id. at 392. 
105. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)). 
106. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 392 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)). 
107. After citing a long list of cases addressing "the standards used to judge ineffec- 
tiveness, the remedy ordered, and the rationale used," the Court held: "We express no opin- 
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Ross v. Moflitt'08 that "the precise rationale for the Grzpn and Doug- 
las lines of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being 
derived fiom the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Arnend- 
ment and some fiom the Due Process Clause of that Amendment,"'09 
and on Bearden v. Ge~rgia,"~ where it held that "[dlue process and 
equal protection principles converge in the Court's analysis in these 
cases.""' The: Court noted that its "rather clear statement in Ross that 
the Due Process Clause played a significant role in prior decisions is 
well supported by the cases them~elves.""~ 
Thus, the Court interpreted Grzfin, where it had reversed a dis- 
missal of an appeal because the petitioner could not afford a tran- 
s~ript,"~ as protecting a state's determination that, "it was unwilling 
to curtail drastically a defendant's liberty unless a second judicial deci- 
sion-maker, the appellate court, was convinced that the conviction was 
in accord with law."l14 Having made that determination, the state 
would have "violated due process principles because it decided the 
appeal in a way that was arbitrary with respect to the issues in- 
vol~ed.' ' '~~ 
ion as to the merits of any of these decisions." Evitts, 469 U.S. at 398 n.9. 
It is true that Strickland has been construed to interpret the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel as requiring no more than a fair trial. See Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland 
Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment 
in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259, 1266 (1986). Under such an inter- 
pretation, the right to counsel, and the other rights enumerated in the Sixth Amendment, are 
no more than guarantees of a fair trial. The right to a fair trial is also a significant aspect 
of the Due Process protection. While it thus could be argued that the Strickland standard is 
fully applicable to the due process right to effective assistance of appellate counsel as well 
as the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, such an argument proves 
too much. If valid, it would do away with the Sixth Amendment and its discrete analysis 
by making it co-extensive with the Fourteenth Amendment The Court has never carried its 
Sixth Amendment analysis that far. 
108. 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
109. Evitfs, 469 U.S. at 403 (quoting Ross, 417 U.S. at 608-09). 
110. 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
111. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 403 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665). 
112. Id 
113. Gr@n, 351 U.S. at 20. 
114. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 403-04. 
115. Id. at 404. 
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Rejecting the state's contention that all rights enjoyed by criminal 
appellants arise only from the equal protection clause, the Evitts Court 
explained that if the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal 
were simply an equal protection right, which would be measured by 
the rights of nonindigents, nonindigents would themselves have no 
right to effective a~sistance."~ In conclusion, the Court explained: 
In cases like Gr@n and Douglas, due process concerns were involved 
because the States involved had set up a system of appeals as of right but 
had refused to offer each defendant a fair opportunity to obtain an adjudi- 
cation on the merits of his appeal. Equal protection concerns were in- 
volved because the State treated a class of defendants - indigent ones - 
differently for purposes of offering them a meaningful appeal. Both of 
these concerns were implicated in the GrifJin and Douglas cases and both 
Clauses supported the decisions reached by this C~ur t . "~  
Although it has recognized the importance of counsel on an appeal 
as of right, the Supreme Court clearly stated in Evitts that since the 
State did not challenge the finding of counsel's deficiency, it "need not 
decide the content of appropriate standards for judging claims of inef- 
fective assistance of appellant counsel. CJ: Strickland v. Washington 
[citation omitted]."l18 As at least one judge has noted, "[alrguably, 
the 'cf.' cite to Strickland implies that the appellate standard might be 
different."'lg 
Additionally, as noted above, the Court's holding that the right to 
effective assistance arises directly out of the due process clause rather 
than from the Sixth Amendment indicates that the Court's analysis of 
the issue of ineffectiveness on appeal may not be the same as its Sixth 
Amendment analysis of ineffectiveness at trial. Thus, Strickland's inter- 
pretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial does not 
necessarily define the standard for appellate-counsel ineffectiveness. 
116. Id. at 404-05. 
117. Id. at 405. Justice Rehnquist, joined by then-Chief Justice Berger dissented on the 
ground that the Court's prior decisions had been based on Equal Protection principles and 
that there was no due process right to effective appellate counsel. Id. at 405, 408. 
118. Id. at 398. 
119. Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798, 808 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., dissenting). See 
infa Parts V.A. and V.B. 
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B. The Nature of the Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate 
Counsel: The Application of Strickland by US. Circuit Courts of 
Appeal 
Faced with the Supreme Court's silence, all of the Circuit Courts 
of Appeal have applied the Strickland standard to claims of ineffective- 
ness of appellate counsel.'20 Most have done so without analysis.I2' 
The Ninth Circuit is the only court to have even attempted an articu- 
lated rationale supporting application of the Strickland standard on 
appeal. 
In United States v. Birtle,'22 the Ninth Circuit relied on the 
Strickland Court's statement that "the principles governing ineffective- 
ness claims should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do 
on direct appeal or in motions for a new trial"'23 as support for the 
proposition that Strickland's analysis of the performance of trial coun- 
sel applies as well to appellate counsel.'24 However, the quoted state- 
ment does not support that conclusion. Rather, a fair reading of this 
language in context indicates that the Court was talking about applica- 
tion of its principles not to performance of counsel in each of these 
three forums but rather td review of inej6ectiveness claims brought in 
these three forums: collateral proceedings, direct appeal, or motions for 
a new trial based on ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The relevant lan- 
guage appears in Section IV of the Strickland opinion, which addresses 
the applicatio:~ of the newly announced standards.I2' The entire para- 
120. United States v. Victoria, 876 F2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1989); Abdurrahman v. 
Henderson, 897 F.2d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1990); Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1987); 
Griffin v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1985); Schwander v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 494, 
501-02 (5th Cir. 1985); Bransford v. Brown, 806 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1986); Gray v. Greer, 
800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986); Blackmon v. White, 825 F.2d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1987); . 
United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1986); Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 
(10th Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775, 780 (llth Cir. 1984), overruled on other 
ground! by Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1494 (llth Cir. 1986). 
121. See, e.g., People v. Santos, 741 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir. 1984); Morgan v. Zant, 743 
F.2d at 780. 
122. 792 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1986). 
123. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
124. Birtle, 792 F.2d at 847. 
125. Section JY of the opinion begins: "A number of practical considerations . . . im- 
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graph in which the relevant language appears is about habeas review; 
indeed, the paragraph concludes that, "no special standards ought to 
I apply to ineffectiveness claims made in habeas  proceeding^."'^^ 
Three years later, and perhaps reflecting the court's uncertainty 
about its statement in Birtle, the Ninth Circuit offered an entirely dif- 
ferent reason for relying on Strickland in assessing claims of ineffec- 
tiveness of appellate counsel. In Miller v. Keeney,'" the court relied 
on language in Penson v. Ohio,'28 where the Supreme Court held that 
cases in which a defendant has been actually or constructively denied 
assistance of appellate counsel are not subject to the Strickland stan- 
dard.lZg According to the Ninth Circuit, this language implied that 
Strickland would apply where the claim is not that counsel was denied, 
but that counsel was ineffective.l3' This, conclusion, however, is fal- 
lacious. The fact that Strickland's prejudice requirement may not apply 
where there is a total deprivation of counsel does not mean that the 
requirement does apply to a claim of deficient performance on appeal. 
C. Categories of Appellate Ineffectiveness Claims 
Applying Strickland, federal decisions evaluating claims of ineffec- 
tiveness of appellate counsel have focused on three major categories of 
ineffectiveness: 
(1) failure to gain or protect access to the appeal, such as 
failure to file a notice of appeal or some other jurisdictional 
portant for the application of the standards we have outlined." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 
126. Id. at 698. 
127. 882 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1989). 
128. 488 U.S. 75 (1988). 
129. Id. at 88-89. The Ninth Circuit's entire analysis is as follows: 
We review claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel according to the 
standard set out in Strickland v. Washington [citation omitted]. United States v. 
Birtle [citation omitted]. See also Penson v. Ohio [citation omitted] (holding that 
where a defendant has been actually or constructively denied the assistance of ap- 
pellate counsel altogether, the Strickland standard does not apply and prejudice is 
presumed; the implication is that Strickland does apply where counsel is present 
but ineffective). 
Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. 
130. Id. 
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document, or the failure to advise the client concerning his 
right to appeal;13' 
(2) deficient perfection of the appeal, such as deficient brief- 
ing, failure to appear at oral argument or to file a reply 
brief;132 and 
(3) deficient selection of appellate issues.133 
1. Securing Access to Appeal 
Findings of ineffectiveness most frequently arise in this first cate- 
gory of cases. Here, either from attorney nonfeasance or malfeasance, a 
defendant is deprived entirely of his right to appellate review. That 
was the case in Evitts v. L u ~ e y , ' ~ ~  where the Supreme Court reversed 
an order dismissing an appeal for failure to file a required "statement 
of appeal" containing procedural details.13' Another example is United 
States v. Gip~0n. l~~ In Gipson, the court vacated an order denying a 
motion to set aside a sentence, where the defendant lost his right to 
appeal by his attorney's failure to inform him about the time limit for 
filing a notice of appeal.13' In a similar case, Bell v. Lo~khart,"~ 
the court vacated an order denying a writ of habeas corpus, where a 
state prisoner had been denied effective assistance of counsel when he 
lost the right to appeal based on incorrect advice concerning the risks 
of appeal.I3' 
131. E.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). 
132. E.g., Lofton v. Whitley, 905 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1990), discussed infa  text accom- 
panying notes 143-45. 
133. E.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), discussed inza text accompanying 
notes 164-68. 
134. 469 U.S. 387 (1985). 
135. See supra text accompanying notes 100-18. 
136. 985 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1993). 
137. Id. at 217. 
138. 795 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1986). 
139. Id at 658. In Bell, the defendant's attorney had erroneously advised him that he 
would again face the death penalty if he were successhl on appeal, even though the death 
sentence had not been imposed following the first trial. Id. at 656. 
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It is easy to see why this type of claim produces the most fie- 
quent finding of ineffectiveness. In these cases, the deficient perfor- 
mance prong of the Strickland standard was either uncontested (as in 
Evitts and Bell) or extremely clear (as in Gipson). There simply is no 
strategic reason for failing to preserve a client's right to appeal. 
Most importantly, the courts have held that in this context a de- 
fendant who loses access to the appellate court need not skiow that he 
has been prejudiced, the most prevalent ground for denying ineffective- 
ness of counsel claims.140 The courts have concluded that a defendant 
who loses his right to appeal because he relies on his attorney's juris- 
dictional error suffers prejudice per se.14' That is, as long as the ap- 
pellant establishes (1) an intention to appeal; and (2) a reliance on the 
attorney to preserve the right to do so, the appellant need not show 
that she had some chance of success on appeal. Thus, having deter- 
mined that the defendants in Gipson and Bell did not otherwise waive 
their rights to appeal, the courts found that they were prejudiced by 
counsel's deficient performance and granted the requested relief.14' 
2. Perfection of Appeal 
The second category of cases - where, although the appeal was 
heard on the merits, counsel's preparation or presentation was deficient 
- is the rarest. Moreover, claims of outright deficient briefing, in the 
sense of the failure to persuasively present the facts, to research the 
law, or to apply relevant law to the facts, are almost always unsuc- 
cessful. An exception is LoJton v. FVl~itley,'~~ where the court held 
that state appellate counsel's submission of a two-page brief raising no 
issues and merely invoking the court's statutorily prescribed review 
"for errors patentyy144 from the record was deficient performance that 
140. See supra note 73; see also infia text accompanying notes 184-86. 
141. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 389-90. 
142. Bell, 795 F.2d at 658; Gipson, 985 F.2d at 217. In fact, an attorney's failure to 
protect a client's access to the appellate court is equivalent to the absence of counsel on 
appeal; that is, counsel does nothing for the client on appeal. Thus, the same per se stan- 
dard applicable to the absence of counsel is applicable here. 
143. 905 F.2d 885. 
144. Id. at 885. 
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was presurnp1:ively prejudicial and required relief.I4' This gross failure 
to press a clicznt's case, in the words of the Evitts Court, to "make the 
adversarial system is the only type of deficient performance 
that is likely to establish ineffecti~eness.'~' 
A recurring claim in this category is that counsel was deficient in 
failing to notice and therefore to correct the absence of portions of the 
trial transcript. For example, in .Bransford v. Brown,148 petitioner 
sought a writ of habeas corpus based on the absence of jury instruction 
' transcripts in the appellate record and his appellate counsel's failure to 
notice and correct that absence.I4' The court held that counsel's per- 
formance was deficient150 by reasoning that, "appellate counsel's duty 
cannot be discharged unless he has a transcript of the court's charge to 
the j~ry."''~ 
Nonetheless, the court refused to grant the writ because the peti- 
tioner failed to satisfy Stricklands prejudice prong.Is2 The court held 
that he had not established prejudice, reasoning that (1) there was no 
showing that the charge could have been located or rec~nstructed;'~~ 
and (2) there was no evidence that, even if available, the transcripts 
would have revealed reversible error.Is4 Indeed, the only evidence in 
this regard was that the trial attorney had "never expressed a belief 
.that the instructions were important to an appeal.""' On this basis, 
the court concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish preju- 
dice.lS6 
145. Id. at 888, 890. 
146. See Evifts, 469 U.S. at 394 ("[tlhe attorney must . . . play the role of an active 
advocate, rather than a mere friend of the court assisting in a detached evaluation of the 
appellant's claim"). 
147. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984); Stano v. Dugger, 
921 F.2d 1125, 1152 (11th Cir. 1991); Harding v. Davis, 878 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1989). 
148. 806 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1986). 
149. Id. at 84. 
150. Id. at 86. 
151. Id. (citing Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 (1964)). 
152. Bransford, 806 F.2d at 87. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. See also Julius v. Johnson, 840 F.2d 1533 (no prejudice established based on 
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Similarly, in Schwander v. Bla~kburn,'~' transcripts of the jury 
voir dire, openings and summations, jury instructions, and jury ques- 
tions were all missing from the record, and counsel failed to obtain 
them.lS8 The court held that because there was no showing that any 
objections were made during any of the missing proceedings, no error 
had been preserved for review under Louisiana's criminal code.'59 
According to the court, the absence of any preserved error was suffi- 
cient to establish that no prejudice resulted from the incomplete tran- 
script.160 The court thus concluded, quoting Strickland, that even if 
there were error, the failure to raise it on appeal "does not warrant 
setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding [because] the error 
had no effect on the judgment."161 
3. Selection of Issues 
. The overwhelming majority of federal decisions regarding ineffec- 
tiveness of appellate counsel concern the third category of claims - 
the failure to raise a specified issue on appeal. Most of these cases 
occur on habeas review of state court convictions, as in Evitts, 
Schwander, Bell, and Bransf~rd. '~~ In this third type of case, the fail- 
ure to raise a specified issue or issues on direct appeal is alleged either 
to constitute a due process violation requiring habeas relief or to estab- 
lish cause for procedural default of that issue in the state court, permit- 
ting federal habeas review.163 Ineffectiveness is very rarely found in 
these cases. 
failure to include voir dire in record since there was no suggestion of any constitutional 
violation during that proceeding), reh'g denied, 854 F.2d 400 (11th Cir. 1988). 
157. 750 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985). 
158. Id. at 497. 
159. Id. at 502. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). 
162. See discussion supra Parts III.C.1. and III.C.2. 
163. The proliferation of these claims is the natural result of the Supreme Court's deci- 
sion in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), which established that ineffectiveness under 
Strickland would constitute cause under the "cause and prejudice" standard for procedural 
default. Id. at 488-89. These cases generally involve the failure to raise an issue, rather than 
other types of deficient performance (for example, an inadequate briet), or failure to appeal 
at all. 
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There are several reasons for this result. As the Supreme Court 
made clear in Jones v. Barnes,164 the decision concerning what issues 
to raise on appeal is firmly committed to counsel's judgment.16s In 
Jones, the Court held that appellate counsel has no constitutional duty 
to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal if counsel, as a matter of 
professional judgment, decides not to raise such an issue.166 In so 
holding, the Court recognized that the decision of what issues to raise 
is one of the most important strategic decisions to be made by appel- 
late c0unse1.l~~ The Court determined that counsel must be able to 
exercise his reasonable professional judgment in selecting the most 
promising issues for review and specifically advised that "a brief that 
raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good argu- 
ment~."'~~ Under Strickland, of course, as a question of strategy, the 
decision about what issues to raise and which ones to omit is subject 
to tremendous deference on appeal.169 Thus, reversal has been ex- 
tremely rare. 
The central focus of the courts in these cases is the merit or lack 
of merit of the unraised issue. However, the courts' defmitions of 
prejudice have not been consistent. In one set of cases, the courts have 
held that the failure to raise an issue that is "without merit" is not 
ineffectivene~s."~ Another way of saying this is that the failure to 
raise an issue that "would not result in reversal" is not ineffective- 
ness.171 In another set of cases, the failure to raise an unpreserved is- 
sue has been rejected as not ineffective."' Although the basis 
164. 463 U.S. 745 (1983). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 754. 
167. Id. at 752. In reality, such a decision reflects several strategic judgments: (1) 
whether to reject an issue of lesser merit in favor of one of merit; (2) whether to reject an 
issue of lesser merit that might impact badly on issues of greater merit; and (3) to raise as 
few issues as possible, so as not to detract fiom issues of merit. 
168. Jones, 463 U.S. at 753. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69. 
170. See, e.g., Meyer v. Sargent, 854 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1988); Kilt v. Clarke, 931 
F.2d 1246 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1990); Heath v. 
Jones, 941 F.2d 1126 (llth Cir. 1991); White v. Florida, 939 F.2d 912 (llth Cir. 1991). 
171. See, e.g., Coe v. Thurma., 922 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1991). 
172. See, e.g., Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1989); Richburg v. 
Hood, 794 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
Heinonline - -  97 W. Va. L. Rev. 26 1994-1995 
19941 EFFECTNE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL 27 
for the finding of no ineffectiveness in these cases is not clear, it most 
likely rests on the perception that unpreserved error is not sfliciently 
clear from the record so that failure to discover it is not ineffective- 
ness. Moreover, reversal rarely is based on unpreserved error so that it 
is a reasonable strategic judgment not to raise it. Another reason for a 
finding of no ineffectiveness may be that because the unpreserved error 
would not have resulted in reversal, the failure to raise it was not 
~rejudicial.'~~ 
A third set of cases do not articulate any degree of merit, noting 
simply that a sufficiently meritorious issue would not have been over- 
looked or omitted by competent counsel. In Claudio v. S~u l ly , '~~  the 
Second Circuit found that the failure to raise a state constitutional 
claim of denial of counsel established deficient performance because 
"[nlo reasonably competent attorney should have missed [it]."'75 
Therefore, the attorney's decision "cannot be viewed reasonably as  a 
strategic de~ision."'~~ 
In a fourth set of cases, rather than look simply at the merit of the 
unraised claim, as the courts do in reviewing trial counsel's decisions, 
the courts treat the issue as one of the relative merit between raised 
and unraised claims. For example, in Gray v. Greer,'77 the court stat- 
ed: 
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on failure to 
raise viable issues, the district court must examine the trial court record to 
determine whether appellate counsel failed to present significant and obvi- 
ous issues on appeal. Significant issues which could have been raised 
should then be compared to those which were raised. Generally, only 
when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the 
presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.'78 
173. While it clearly is more difficult to establish prejudice and thus ineffectiveness 
where the omitted issue is unpreserved, it would be possible to establish ineffectiveness 
where the federal court concludes that the state court would have entertained the issue under 
the state court's plain error standard of review. See Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798 (2d 
Cir. 1992). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 805. 
176. Id. 
177. 800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986). 
178. Id at 646. See also Freeman, 962 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1992) (no strategic reason 
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The court remanded the case to the district court: 
[ g o  review the trial court record and determine whether the issues which 
petitioner claims appellate counsel failed to raise, would have been clearly 
more likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial, and were so 
obvious fiom the trial record that the failure to present such issues 
amounted to ineffective assistance of appellate co~nsel."~ 
Similarly, in Mayo v. Hender~on,'~~ the court found ineffective- 
ness in appellate counsel's failure to raise as an appellate issue the 
prosecutor's :failure to turn over prior statements of witnesse~.'~~ That 
issue had been preserved; indeed at trial the court had castigated the 
prosecutor for her conduct. Moreover, the state's highest court had 
established, i n  another case, that the failure to turn over such prior 
statements was reversible per se. In finding ineffectiveness, the Mayo 
court noted that appellate counsel had raised significantly weaker 
issues, such :is a challenge to credibility determinations by a pretrial 
hearing court and a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence where 
there was eyewitness identification proof.Is2 
Case law indicates that only where counsel fails to raise a clear, 
preserved, anti meritorious issue will that failure be held to constitute 
ineffectivene~:;.'~~ That is, despite the Strickland performance standard 
of reasonable competence, courts generally refuse to find ineffective- 
ness unless counsel overlooked a clearly winning issue.184 Indeed, 
exists for failing to raise strongest issue in case). 
179. Gray, 800 F.2d at 647. 
180. 13 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 1994). 
181. Such statements are denominated Rosario material in New York pursuant to People 
v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y. 1961). 
182. Mayo, 13 F.3d at 536. Echoing the Seventh Circuit's language in Gray, the court 
held that, on review of the record: 
[Slignificant issues which could have been raised should then be compared to those 
which were raised. Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than 
those presented will the presumption of effective assistance be overcome. 
Id at 533 (quoting Gray, 800 F.2d at 646). 
183. Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1992); Daniel v. Thigpen, 742 F. Supp. 
1535 (M.D. Ala 1990); Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986). 
184. This is a result of importing the prejudice prong into the perfonnance prong. See 
infia text accompanying note 278. 
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most appellate courts have resolved these claims by taking advantage 
of the Strickland Court's permission to proceed directly to the preju- 
dice prong of Strickland7lg5 holding that even if counsel's decision 
about what issues to raise was unreasonable, the defendant was not 
prejudiced by that decision.lg6 
Judicial focus on the merit of unraised claims - that is, on 
Strickland's prejudice prong - causes several problems in the context 
of reviewing claims of ineffective appellate counsel. First, confusion 
exists about whether the degree of merit is relevant to the performance 
prong of the Strickland test, the prejudice prong, or both. Thus, for 
example, in United States v. Vi~toria,'~~ the First Circuit held that 
counsel's failure to raise ccmeritless points" would not have aected the 
outcome of the trial, clearly focusing on the failure to establish preju- 
dice.''' In Beavers v. L o ~ k h a r t , ~ ~ ~  the court held that the failure to 
argue several issues did not establish ineffectiveness of counsel. How- 
ever, the court failed entirely to specify whether that failure constituted 
deficient performance, lack of prejudice, or both.lgO Finally, in Miller 
v. Keeney,lgl the Ninth Circuit explicitly held that the two prongs of 
Strickland ccpartially overlap"192 because appellate counsel will choose 
not to raise an issue because counsel foresees little or no success and 
because the *failure to raise that issue will not amount to prejudice.lg3 
However, while the relative merit of a course of action is to some ex- 
tent involved in evaluating whether reasonably competent counsel 
would have pursued it, the Strickland Court explicitly formulated the 
185. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
186. See, e.g., Holland v. Scully, 797 F.2d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 1986); Whitley v. Bair, 802 
F.2d 1487, 1494 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing SfricMand, 466 U.S. at 697)); Willie v. Maggio, 
737 F.2d 1372, 1392 (5th Cir. 1984), United States v. Fakhoury, 819 F.2d 1415, 1419 (7th 
Cir. 1987). 
187. 876 F.2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1989). 
188. Id. at 1013. 
189. 755 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1985). 
190. Id. at 663. 
191. 882 F.2d 1428 (9th Cu. 1989). 
192. Id. at 1434. 
193. As the court stated: "Appellate counsel will therefore frequently remain above an 
objective standard of competence (prong one) and have caused her client no prejudice (prong 
two) for the same reason - because she declined to raise a weak issue. Such is the case 
here." Id. 
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"reasonable probability" of success standard solely for evaluation of 
prejudice - the second part of its test.Ig4 It did not suggest that the 
likelihood of success was relevant to determining cornpeten~e.'~' In- 
deed, its express grant of permission to the courts to proceed directly 
to the prejudlice testIg6 is additional evidence that the two are sepa- 
rate. To the extent that courts have evaluated appellate counsel compe- 
tence by focusing on the likely success of omitted issues, they are 
"altering the first prongyy of Strickland without authority.'97 
Aside h m  generating confusion between the two prongs of the 
StricWand test, the focus on the merits of omitted claims has created 
another significant problem. Many issue-omission cases are adjudicated 
on federal habeas review of state convictions, either in the context of 
procedural default or on the merits. In those cases, the omitted issue 
was never presented to a state court.lg8 Thus, as discussed more filly 
below,Ig9 on Elabeas review, the federal court must predict the resolu- 
tion of unraised issues under state constitutional and common law 
where the state has not addressed those issues. In cases in which the 
omitted issue was not preserved, the federal court must also predict 
whether a state appellate court would be willing to entertain an unpre- 
served issue as plain or fundamental error.200 - 
Traditionidly, the federal habeas courts sit to correct federal consti- 
tutional errors by the state courts, not to predict state court interpre- 
tations of state law.201 The extent to which the simple corrective 
194. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
195. See Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d at 810 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("[slince 
Strickland used 'reasonable probability' to measure the likelihood that a trial outcoma would 
have been different [in order to assess prejudice from lawyering already determined to be 
deficient], it is ill-advised to press this same standard into service for the different task of 
determining whether counsel's performance was deficient"). 
196. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
197. See supra note 195. 
198. See, e.g., id (where the omitted issue was a state constitutional claim). The failure 
to raise the claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in the state courts has not been 
found to constitutr: procedural default in such cases. 
199. See injk Part 1V.B. 
200. See, e.g., Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S.  Ct. 
2347 (1993); Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, No. 93-9353, 1994 
WL 245420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994). 
201. See generally Rachel A. Van Cleave, When t3 an Error Not an "Error"? Habeas 
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function intrudes on the concept of federalism has generated substantial 
concern and resulted in substantial Supreme Court limitation on habeas 
review?02 Federal interpretation of state law and prediction of state 
court results are major additional intrusions beyond the appropriate 
corrective role of the habeas courts?" 
IV. THE APPLICATION OF STRICKLAND TO APPELLATE COUNSEL 
As noted above, all of the Circuit Courts of Appeals are currently 
applying ihe Strickland standard to evaluate the effectiveness of appel- 
late counsel.204 This section analyzes the applicability of Strickland to 
appellate counsel in light of the functional differences between trial and 
appellate counsel and the differences in the trial and appellate forums. 
It also surveys the way in which the courts of appeals are applying 
Strichdand to appellate counsel. 
Corpus and Cumulative Error Analysis,  BA BAY LOR L. REV. 59 (1993). 
202. See supra note 15. 
203. Claudio, 982 F.2d at 810 (Ne\vman, J., dissenting). In Claudio, this federal "star 
gazing" resulted in a grant of a writ of habeas corpus where counsel had failed to raise an 
issue in the New York Court of Appeals after it had been rejected by the Appellate Divi- 
sion. Id. at 806. To grant the writ, the Second Circuit analyzed Nevi York law and deter- 
mined that the issue had a reasonable probability of success in the Court of Appeals under 
Court of Appeals case law. Id at 805. In fact, when the case was later decided by the New 
York Court of Appeals on remand, the conviction was affirmed. People v. Claudio, 629 
N.E.2d 384 (N.Y. 1993). 
Parenthetically, where ineffectiveness of appellate counsel is reviewed in the state 
courts, such as New York, the appellate court that determines the ineffectiveness claim is 
the same court that entertained the ineffectively presented appeal, and the same court that 
would entertain the merits of the properly presented appeal if relief is granted. See People 
v. Bachert, 516 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Ct App. 1987). That court knows whether it would have 
reversed or would reverse based on the performance of an effective attorney. Because of 
this, the concept of "probability" that fits ineffectiveness in the trial context - where the 
outcome - the verdict - cannot be reconstructed (so that some speculation will always be 
required), or can only be reconstructed after the expense and effort of an entirely new trial 
- is not appropriate on appeal. 
204. See supra Part IILB. 
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A. Functional Dzyerences between Trial and Appellate Counsel 
1. Trial Counsel 
Chronologically, trial counsel's frst  duty is to inform herself about 
the facts. In doing so, counsel must interview the defendant and his 
witnesses; formulate a theory of the case; evaluate the relevant law; 
determine the scope of the investigation; advise the client of his rights; 
determine what if any pretrial motions to make; draft, file, and litigate 
those motions; dete&e whether to and if so how to plea barg&, 
and, if no bargain results, determine how to try the case. If there is a 
trial, counsel must advise the client about the advantages of a bench 
trial or a j q r  trial; if a jury trial is selected, counsel must participate 
in voir dire, decide whether to give an opening statement; decide 
whether to present a defense, and if so, what witnesses to call; deter- 
mine how and to what extent to conduct cross-examination; determine 
what trial motions to make and when to object; decide what charges to 
request; sum up; decide whether, and if so, what to argue in post-trial 
motions; and determine what to argue in mitigation of sentence. This 
list, modeled after the ABA Standards for Criminal Justi~e,2~~ in- 
cludes only the most basic functions of trial counsel. 
Several considerations arguably support the Supreme Court's refus- 
al in Strickland to formulate a checklist of defense duties and to defer 
almost entirely to counsel's decisions. While it may seem obvious, 
evaluating the quality of trial counsel's performance depends largely on 
the facts of the case.'06 For example, the decision to spend time and 
money investigating an alibi may be good strategy in one case; howev- 
205. STANDAIDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSncE §§ 4-3.2(a), 4-3.8 (2d ed. 1980). 
206. As the court in DeCoster stated: 
The defense attorney's hnction consists, in large part, of the application of profes- 
sional judgment to an infinite variety of decisions in the development and prosecu- 
tion of the case. A determination whether any given action or omission by counsel 
amounted to ineffective assistance cannot be divorced from consideration of the 
peculiar facts and circumstances that influenced counsel's judgment. In this fact- 
laden atmosphere, categorical rules are not appropriate. 
United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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er, where stronger defenses exist, that decision may appear strategically 
questionable. Similarly, the extent of cross-examination depends almost 
entirely on what has occurred on direct examination and on the other 
evidence in the case. Plea bargaining strategy is also heavily fact- 
based. 
Moreover, most of the facts upon which counsel will formulate her 
strategy are revealed during counsel's investigation and, because of 
rules of confidentiality or otherwise, will never be exposed to judicial 
scrutiny. The inevitable absence of such essential information for the 
reviewing court may underlie the Strickland Court's determination that 
substantial deference must be given to counsel's decisions as reason- 
ably strategic choices.207 
Similarly, much of the information that affects trial counsel's deci- 
sions necessarily comes from the client.208 The appropriately extensive 
involvement of the client has several legally significant consequences. 
First, counsel's conduct and decisions may represent or be influenced 
by the client's own desires about the course of the representation it- 
self.20g The involvement of the client in certain strategic decisions al- 
207. The DeCoster court stated: 
Realistically, a defense attorney develops his case in large part from information 
supplied by his client. As the Third Circuit indicated in Green, choices based on 
such information should not later provide the basis for a claim of ineffectiveness 
even though that basis would have been undercut by inquiry of others. Judicial 
intervention to require that a lawyer run beyond, or around, his client, would raise 
ticklish questions of intrusion into the attomeylclient relationship, and should be 
reserved from extreme cases where an effect on the outcome can be demonstrated. 
DeCoster, 624 F.2d at 209-10. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725 
(1st Cir. 1987) (failure to cross-examine three incriminating witnesses was reasonable trial 
strategy since it might have reinforced direct and there was no showing that cross-examina- 
tion would have revealed anything that might have changed the verdict). 
208. See, e.g., Schwander v. Blackbum, 750 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 1985) (failure to 
call sister as witness was not ineffectiveness where there was no evidence that the defendant 
mentioned to counsel that his sister could corroborate his alibi); United States v. Gray, 878 
F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1989) (no ineffectiveness since reasonableness of counsel's actions in 
investigation may be affected by the client's actions and choices). 
209. As the Strickland Court noted: 
The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influ- 
enced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually 
based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on 
information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions 
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so may raise questions of waiver. It may well be that counsel's deci- 
sion to forego a line of defense or a course of representation resulted 
from the  client.'^ own decision. 
Finally, many of the decisions for which trial counsel is responsi- 
ble, pdcularky those during trial, must be made quickly. Strict and 
invasive judicial scrutiny of these decisions would interfere with the 
need for prompt action.210 Accordingly, counsel's decisions must be 
entitled to deference. 
These principles have resulted in a substantial body of case law 
establishing few principles about the components of reasonably compe- 
tent assistance, except that no decision by counsel that can fairly be 
deemed strategic will constitute ineffectivene~s.~" Examples of legiti- 
mate strategic decisions include failure to cross-examine prosecution 
witnesses,212 f ~ l u r e  to object at all or to fully object,2I3 and waiver 
of closing argument.214 
On the other hand, those aspects of representation that have been 
the basis for fuidings of ineffectiveness are those that cannot readily be 
are reasonable depends critically on such information. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (a reviewing court must 
scrutinize those inslances where the defendant "has given counsel reason to believe that 
pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful"); Bainter v. Trickey, 932 
F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1991) (no ineffectiveness for failure to file motion for new trial where 
client initially indicated he did not wish to appeal his convictions). 
210. See, e.g., United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[tlhe 
performance standard is to be applied not in hindsight, but based on what the lawyer knew, 
or should have known, at the time his tactical choices were made and implemented") (citing 
United States v. Bor;ch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 986 
(1992); Campell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 673 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that judicial review of 
trial counsel's performance is highly deferential), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994); Unit- 
ed States v. Sands, 968 F.2d 1058, 1065 (10th Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
987 (1993). 
211. See discussion supra Part IILC.3. 
212. See, e.g., United States v. Michaud, 925 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1987) (no ineffectiveness since cross-examination 
might have reinforced direct examination and thus was reasonable trial strategy). 
213. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236 (1st Cir. 1990) (failure to object 
during opening statement); Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487, 495 (5th Cir. 1986) (failure 
to fully object to prosecutor's summation), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986). 
214. See, e.g., United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 986 (1992). 
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justified as strategic. They include, for example, lack of awareness or 
understanding of essential legal principles$'' failure to conduct any 
pretrial in~estigation;~'~ failure to conduct dis~overy;~~' failure to 
contact a potential alibi witness or to locate other corroborating or 
other disinterested ~i tnesses ;~ '~  the decision to forgo the only avail- 
able defense$'' or, in a capital case, to fail to investigate all possible 
lines of defenset20 failure to investigate mitigating family and medi- 
cal evidence in mitigation of death sentence and to be otherwise unpre- 
pared to argue in mitigation of sentence$' failure to obtain a tran- 
script of a prior trial to impeach key wi tnesse~;~  failure to object to 
the court's refusal to conduct an ex parte inquiry before denying a 
request for psychiatric expert assi~tance;~ and failure to properly and 
timely raise an issue of lack of corroborating evidence in a murder 
215. See, e.g., Lewandowski v. Makel, 949 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1991) (failure to recog- 
nize change in law that resulted in defendant's failure to be aware that if he prevailed on 
appeal to withdraw guilty plea to second degree murder he could again be charged with 
first degree murder). 
216. The failure adequately to investigate cases exists because counsel can hardly be 
said to have made a strategic choice against pursuing a certain lime of investigation when 
counsel has not yet obtained the facts on which such a decision could be made. See, e.g., 
Sullivan, 819 F.2d 1391, 1391-92 @&functory attempts to contact witnesses); Code v. 
Montgomery, 799 F.2d 1481, 1483 (11th Cir. 1986) (counsel interviewed only one witness); 
Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1985) (reiterating duty to make independent 
investigation); Crisp v. Duckworth, 743 F.2d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 1226 (1985). 
217. See, e.g., Morrison v. Kimmelman, 752 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1985). 
218. See, e.g., Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1985); Sullivan v. Fairman, 
819 F.2d 1382, 1391 (7th Cir. 1987); Montgomery v. Petersen, 846 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 
1988); Workman v. Tate, 957 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1992) (failure to contact two witnesses 
defendant was with during events leading to his anest, whose testimony would have directly 
contradicted arresting officers). 
219. See, e.g., Weidner v. Wainwright, 708 F.2d 614, 616 (I lth Cir. 1983). 
220. See, e.g., Osbom v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 627 (10th Cir. 1988). 
221. Id. 
222. See, e.g., Blackbum v. Foltz, 828 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied. 485 
U.S. 970 (1988). 
223. See, e.g., United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 266 (1993) & 114 S. Ct. 560 (1993). 
224. See, e.g., Summit v. Blackbum, 795 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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2. Appellate Counsel 
Representation of a defendant on appeal is very different from trial 
representation. Anders v. Californip requires that an accused have 
cc counsel acting in the role of an advocate." But what must that advo- 
cate do? 
In Evitts Y. L u ~ e y , ~ ~  the Court outlined the general scope of the 
due process right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal: 
This right to counsel is limited to the first appeal as of  right [citation 
omitted] anal the attorney need not advance every argument, regardless of 
merit, urged by the appellant [citation omitted]. But the attorney must be 
available to assist in preparing and submitting a brief to the appellate 
court [citation omitted] and must play the role of an active advocate, rath- 
er  than a mere friend of the court assisting in a detached evaluation of  the 
appellant's claim. [citation ~rni t ted] .~ '  
The Evitts Court articulated two dimensions to the role of effective 
appellate counsel: the ability to obtain a favorable decision by making 
the adversary system work, and "that of expert professional whose 
assistance is nc:cessary in a legal system governed by complex rules 
and procedures for the defendant to obtain a decision at all - much 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
225. 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967). 
226. 469 U.S. 387 (1984). 
227. Eviits, 469 U.S. at 394. It is important to emphasize the Supreme Court's recogni- 
tion - which is perhaps contrary to the common perception-that appellate counsel has an 
important role to play as an adversary. The commonly held perception that an appeal in- 
volves no more than the objective application of established law to record facts has repeat- 
edly been rejected by the Court. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967) 
(appellate counsel must be an "active advocate" rather than a detached evaluator); Penson v. 
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (once the court determines that there are nonfrivolous issues, it 
must appoint counsel, and may not rely on its own review of the record or on the briefs of 
a co-appellant). As cliscussed in&, Part V.B., the fact that some courts claim to conduct an 
independent review of the record in every case is not relevant to establishing a standard for 
appellate counsel's performance. Indeed, the presence of appellate judges is no more relevant 
than the presence of a trial judge, which was, of course, never even mentioned by the 
Strickland Court 
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less a favorable decision - on the merits of the case."228 These di- 
mensions exist regardless of the facts of the case. 
To fulfill this role, counsel must perform several specific duties. 
First, counsel must be familiar with and follow the court's rules for 
protecting the defendant's right to appeal, such as the rules of proce- 
dure for filing the notice of appeal and any related statements and for 
ordering the transcript. Second, counsel must review the record for 
possible appellate issues. Third, counsel must determine what issues to 
raise in light of the facts, the law, the standard of review, and the 
scope of review. Fourth, counsel must decide how to formulate those 
issues. Fifth, counsel must find and use the most persuasive authority 
available. And sixth, counsel must write persuasively - including mar- 
shalling the facts, analyzing the law, and applying it to the facts?29 
B. Forum Differences and Their Effect on Finality 
In addition to functional differences between trial and appellate 
counsel, several differences between the trial and appellate forums 
affect the courts' review of the effectiveness of trial and appellate 
228. As the Court explained: 
To prosecute the appeal a criminal appellant must face an adversary proceeding 
that - like a trial - is governed by intricate mles that to a layperson would be 
hopelessly forbidding. An unrepresented appellant - l i e  an unrepresented defen- 
dant at trial - is unable to protect the vital interests at stake . . . . In short, the 
promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel on appeal - 
like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel at trial 
- would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396-97. 
229. I have not included the ability to orally argue as an essential skill of appellate 
counsel. While it is an important skill, oral argument has been held not to be a critical 
stage of the criminal process [U.S. v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846 (9th Cir 1986)]; moreover, the 
action of some courts in either granting oral argument only in the court's discretion (See, 
e.g., IST CIR. R. 34(a); 4 m  CIR. R. 34(a); 7 m  CIR. R. 34(f)), limiting oral argument to 
very short periods of time (See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. 34@) (10-15 minutes); 3D CIR. R. 1.0.P. 
2.1 (usually 15 minutes); 6 m  CJR. R I.O.P. 19.4.1 (15 minutes)), or abolishing it entirely 
for some variety of cases (See, e.g., 8 m  C R  R. 34-4) indicates, objectively, that oral argu- 
ment is only rarely as significant as the written brief. The subjective, anecdotal reports of 
appellate judges confirm this. 
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counsel. These differences make the wholesale adoption of the 
StrickZand standard on appeal inappropriate. 
First, unlike trial representation, which is focused on development 
of the facts, an appeal must be based on the record of proceedings 
below. As a result, the input fiom the client is much more limited than 
it is at trial. In addition, at least as compared with trial counsel, none 
of appellate counsel's duties need be performed under time pressure 
and thus are not entitled to the same amount of deference as those 
decisions of trial counsel that must necessarily be made quickly. 
Moreover, unlike the relief sought based on ineffectiveness of trial 
counsel - reversal of a conviction (or habeas grant) and a new trial 
- the relief sought for ineffectiveness of appellate counsel is a re- 
opening of a previously decided appeal or the granting of an appeal 
that was improperly forfeited initially."' That relief requires substan- 
tially fewer judicial resources and is substantially less damaging to the 
finality of criminal judgments. 
In addition, because in many cases the facts upon which appellate 
counsel's decisions are made appear in the trial record, claims of inef- 
fectiveness of appellate counsel can be, and frequently are, resolved 
without hearings or with abbreviated hearings.231 Even where the 
claimed ineffectiveness arises from failure to raise an issue, or where a 
claim is litigated on federal habeas in the district court, courts general- 
ly do not hold extensive hearings to determine why counsel did not 
raise an omitted issue because the reason is obvious from the record 
itself and frorr~ examination of the relative merits of the raised &d 
unraised Again, this is a function of the lesser importance 
230. Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775 (llth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 
(1988), overruled on other groundr by Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1494 (llth Cir. 
1986). 
231. See, e.g., Luke v. Iowa, 465 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1990) (all issues resolved on 
record, including failure to raise issue); Abdunahman v. Henderson, 897 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 
1990) (issue of failure to raise issue resolved on the record); Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439 
(3d Cir. 1987) (issue of prejudice resolved on the record), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 979 
(1988); Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986). 
232. Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (district court was not required to hold hearing 
to determine why appellate counsel did not raise a specific issue, but must examine the trial 
record and the appellate brief). Even if a hearing is required, given the intrinsic irrelevance 
Heinonline - -  97 W. Va. L. Rev. 38 1994-1995 
19941 EFFECTWE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL 39 
of the facts on appeal than at trial. Thus, resolution of a claim of inef- 
fective appellate counsel is easier and more efficient than resolution of 
a claim of ineffective trial counsel. 
Moreover, when a court reviews a claim of ineffectiveness of trial 
counsel, it must determine the effect of lawyer incompetence on a jury 
that is no longer available. Such a court must speak in terms of proba- 
bilities, as the Strickland standard requires?33 This fact, combined 
with the sanctity of jury verdicts, means that convictions are reversed 
only when it is sufficiently likely that the result is unreliable.234 
Where ineffectiveness of appellate counsel is concerned, however, the 
probability of unreliability is not as important because the state appel- 
late court that would have considered the effectively presented appeal 
remains available to do so on remand and without disturbing the un- 
derlying criminal conviction. 
Moreover, as noted above$' where ineffectiveness of appellate 
counsel claims are adjudicated on federal habeas corpus, the probability 
analysis forces the federal court to predict or second-guess the state 
court's evaluation of the merits of an appeal. This is an inappropriately 
intrusive role under our system of federalism and one that is entirely 
unnecessary because the state appellate court is l l l y  available to con- 
sider the merits of the case. 
Indeed, the resolution of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims 
requires fewer judicial resources than resolution of ineffectiveness of 
trial counsel claims. In support of an application for relief based on 
of the facts of a given case to appellate counsel's representation (see supra Part IV.A.2. (the 
focus being on the record and existing state law)), such a hearing would still be less bnr- 
densome than one involving ineffectiveness of trial counsel, 
233. Strickland 466 U.S. at 694. See supra text accompanying note 58. 
234. Indeed, it is simply unrealistic to pretend that the appellate court does not do 
precisely that in determining the ineffectiveness claim itself. Analysis of the case law makes 
clear that the merit of the issues left unraised or treated deficiently is the linchpin of every 
effectiveness question. See Parton v. Wyrick, 704 F.2d 415, 416 (8th Cir. 1983) (no inef- 
fectiveness unless the issue omitted by appellate counsel "had arguable merif'); Bransford v. 
Brown, 806 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1986) (failure to notice missing jury instructions and other 
proceedings not ineffectiveness under Strickland because no showing that transcripts would 
have revealed reversible error and where trial counsel apparently never indicated they would 
reveal error), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1056 (1987). 
235. See supra text accompanying notes 198-203. 
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ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, the applicant generally submits a 
brief that cures the deficiency that occurred when the appeal was origi- 
nally heard. For example, if the claim is that an issue was.ignored, 
that issue will be fully briefed; if the claim is that the brief was defi- 
cient, a competent brief will be filed. By doing this, the applicant can 
show the court not only what kind of job effective counsel would have 
performed (and compare it to what had been filed before); she can also 
establish the merit of the appeal and can convince the court that little 
time and expense will be required to resolve the case on the merits. 
Thus, as far as remedy is concerned, all that a court need do to cure 
the deprivation of effective counsel is to vacate the appellate judgment, 
reopen the appeal, permit the virtually completed briefs to be filed, and 
allow the case to be decided, or even decide the case on the mer- 
i t ~ . ' ~ ~  This takes very little additional time or effort and conserves 
valuable judicial reso~rces.~~' 
Similarly, the appropriate remedy for denial of effective assistance 
of counsel on appeal that results in the total loss of the right to appeal 
is to remand the case for resentencing so that a timely notice of appeal 
can be filed238 or to permit the filing of an untimely notice of ap- 
peal.ug After the notice of appeal is filed, the case is placed back on 
the appellate court's calendar for full briefing and arg~ment.'~' 
Thus, a fuiding of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel does not 
have the dire consequences for finality that so concerned the Strickland 
Court. A criminal conviction is not necessarily overturned, as it must 
always be when trial counsel is found to have been constitutionally 
ineffective. The prosecution is not put to the difficult task of proving 
236. See, e.g., People v. Rutter, 1994 WL 521923 (N.Y. App. Div. First Dep't, Sept. 
22, 1994) (on corafiz nobis application in the intermediate appellate court, conviction re- 
versed and case remanded for a new trial). 
237. Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d at 646 (in determining whether decision not to raise a 
given issue was stratc:gic, the "district court should be guided by defendant's carefbl presen- 
tation of those issues which allegedly should have been raised on appeal, with accompanying 
citations to the trial record"). 
238. See, e.g., Morgan v. Zanf 743 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Gipson, 985 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1993). 
239. See, e.g., Bell v. Lockhart, 795 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1986); Lofton v. Whitley, 905 
F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1990). 
240. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 757 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Ark. 1988). 
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guilt again, perhaps years after the crime. Rather,.the prosecution must 
simply respond to a brief filed by a constitutionally adequate attorney, 
and the state courts must entertain a properly perfected appeal. 
A. Defining Reasonable Competence of Appellate Counsel 
1. Securing Access to Appeal 
As discussed above, in cases where an ineffectiveness of appellate 
counsel claim arises out of counsel's failure to protect a defendant's 
access to an appeal as of right, the courts have employed Strickland's 
reasonable competence standard but have not r e q ~ e d  a showing of 
prejudice.241 This is the proper standard. As in other right to counsel 
cases in which prejudice is presumed - cases involving absence of 
counsel242 or conflicts of - the difficult burden of deter- 
mining prejudice from denial of appeal justifies a finding of prejudice 
per se. Moreover, because a defendant seeking relief in such a case 
must establish that he intended to appeal and relied on his attorney to 
do so, there is no case in which the failure to take an appeal will be 
strategic. In addition, the remedy for deprivation of access to appeal is 
simple and efficient - an appeal is granted, either by ordering a pro 
forma resentence to start the time to appeal running or by 
granting permission to file a late notice of appeal.245 No unfairness is 
created for the prosecution since the appeal is based entirely on the 
241. See supra Part 1II.B. 
242. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 
U.S. 853 (1975); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 
U.S. 52 (1961). 
243. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (prejudice presumed under 
Strickland if defendant demonstrates (1) actual conflict, and (2) that such conflict adversely 
affected his lawyer's performance); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987) (same). 
244. See supra note 238. 
245. See supra notes 239-40. 
Heinonline - -  97 W. Va. L. Rev. 41 1994-1995 
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW pol .  97:l 
transcript.246 111 denial-of-access cases, therefore, the courts need not 
review counseEYs performance with deference. 
2. Pc:rfection of Appeal 
As to claims of ineffectiveness based on inadequate preparation of 
the appellate briefs, Strickland's "reasonable competence" standard247 
is appropriate but must be defined to require the reasonable perfor- 
mance of appellate skills. That is, in addition to protecting the 
defendant's right to appeal, every appellate lawyer must (1) secure and 
read essential portions of the record; (2) accurately set out the facts 
with supporting citations to the record; (3) research the applicable law; 
(4) use relevant and persuasive authority; (5) select strategically among 
the issues presented, considering the strength of authority, the facts, 
and the standard and scope of review;248 and (6) apply the law to the 
facts of the case. 
Although the Strickland court declined to formulate a "checklist 
for judicial eviiluation of attorney perf~rmance,'"~~ the functional dif- 
ferences between trial and appellate counsel justify such an approach 
here.'" Moreover, there is no justification for Strickland's highly def- 
erential standard of review when applied to appellate counsel's perfor- 
mance. Like the failure to protect a client's access to the appellate 
courts, the fail~ue to perform the above basic duties can never be con- 
sidered a strategic decision.251 
The reasons underlying Strickland's reluctance to formulate a 
checklist simpljr do not apply in the appellate context. First, unlike the 
246. In the m: case in which the transcript may be unavailable, proceedings can be 
held to reconstruct what occurred, as they would be in any case in which essential portions 
of the record are missing. 
247. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58. 
248. See discus:iion infra Part V.A.3. 
249. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
250. See discussion supra Part 1V.A. 
251. As demonstrated above, while many courts have noted that the involvement of the 
appellate court in reviewing the record and in inquiring into possible issues might justify a 
more relaxed perfomlance standard for ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims, analytical- 
ly and realistically, such judicial involvement is irrelevant. 
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trial context, as to which the Strickland Court held that, "[nlo particu- 
lar set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take 
account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the 
range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal 
defendant,"252 the range of legitimate strategic possibilities on appeal 
is limited. Again, unlike trial decisions, changes in the facts only mar- 
ginally affect the necessity or scope of appellate counsel's decisions. 
Nor would mandating the performance of these skills "interfere 
with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict 
the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions"253 
or "distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy 
of the defendant's cause."z4 There is simply no conceivable appellate 
context in which the listed skills are not required, and consequently, 
"there can be no strategic choice that renders such [skills] unneces- 
~ary."~" These requirements are 'not likely to create a minimum stan- 
d&d that would become the norm or to result in a "proliferation of 
- 
ineffectiveness challenges."256 Simply put, most lawyers perform these 
basic functions. 
Moreover, in marked contrast to trial counsel's performance, the 
context and record on which all of these decisions are made is fully 
available to a court reviewing appellate counsel's performance. Thus, 
appellate attorney performance is not entitled to the same deference as 
trial counsel performance, and the litigation of appellate ineffectiveness 
claims should be considerably less complicated and more efficient than 
trial ineffectiveness claims. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Gray v. 
GreerYz7 an appeal is based on the record and the case law. All of 
the facts that inform counsel's decisions are contained in the trial re- 
cord; all of the law upon which counsel's decisions are based is avail- 
252. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. 
253. Id. at 689. 
254. Id. 
255. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680. Because of this, there is no danger of creating a 
minimum standard that would become the norm. Every appeal must be handled in this way. 
In fact, if every appellate lawyer were required to undertake the above enumerated steps, the 
standard of representation would improve. 
256. Id. at 690. 
257. Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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able to the Thus, there is no reason to defer to trial counsel, 
to presume reasonable competence, or to hold extensive hearings. 
It also is relevant that appellate counsel's duties are not signifi- 
cantly affected in any way by the client's participation. Unlike the 
client's centrdl role at trial,259 the role of the client in perfecting the 
appeal typically is limited. Indeed, while retained appellate lawyers 
may solicit the client's input or review in drafting the brief, few ex- 
pect substantial input fiom non-lawyer clients. Ordinarily, assigned or 
legal aid lawyers, who have large caseloads, do not ask their clients to 
review drafts of their briefs, give them little time to review a draft 
sent largely as a courtesy, or simply send the client the final version of 
the brief when it is filed with the court.260 Indeed, assigned counsel 
plans may not authorize funds to have the transcript copied for a 
client's review. This may or may not foster good attorney-client rela- 
tions, but it reflects two realities of the appellate forum: clients rarely 
have anything helpful to contribute to brief writing. In light of that, 
allowing time and money to insure their input can substantially delay 
the hearing of the appealz6' and contribute substantially - but unnec- 
essarily - to an appellate lawyer's workload. Again, a hearing ad- 
dressed to the client's contribution is likely to be brief, if any is re- 
quired, and no substantial appellate deference is warranted. 
3. Selection of Issues 
While the selection of issues is clearly that consider- 
ation should not completely insulate the process from reviewaZb3 AS in 
258. Id 
259. See discussion supra Part 1V.A.I. 
260. This infonnation comes fiom seventeen years of appellate practice, including repre- 
senting criminal derendants on appeal, screening applications for admission to an indigent 
defendant's appellate: panel, and teaching criminal appellate practice to law students. 
261. In cases where an indigent defendant-appellant requests a copy of his trial tran- 
script, appellate counsel must forward her copy after the brief is completed. If the client 
wishes to file a supplemental. brief he must request court permission to do so. However, the 
case will not be cillendared for argument until the supplemental brief and transcript are 
filed. 
262. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). 
263. The court in Gray, 800 F.2d at 646, stated: "Were it legitimate to dismiss a claim 
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Strickland, "[i]nformed decision[s] based on reasonable professional 
 judgment[^]'^^ will not support a claim of ineffectiveness." In deter- 
mining whether a reasonable professional judgment is involved in the 
selection of issues on appeal, the standard should be whether the ne- 
glected issue has sufficient merit, in light of the other available issues, 
that reasonably competent counsel would have pursued it. Sufficient 
merit should be determined in light of the strength of authority, the 
facts, the standard of review, and the scope of review. The standard 
should not be the standard currently applied in reality by the courts, 
i. e., whether counsel omitted a clear and winning i~sue.2~' 
Several courts presently do require a comparative analysis of the 
issues that were raised and the issues that were not raised.266 If the 
reviewing court determines that the omitted issue or issues are of suffi- 
cient merit that a reasonably competent lawyer would have raised them 
either in addition to or rather than the issues raised, the presumption of 
effectiveness of counsel should be 0vercorne.2~' 
of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal solely because we found it improper to review 
appellate counsel's choice of issues, the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal 
would be worthless." 
264. Griffm v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226, 1235 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 
1007 (1986). 
265. See supra text accompanying notes 183-86. 
266. See, e.g., Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, No. 93- 
2007, 1994 WL 273742 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994). 
267. Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986). As the court in Gray ex- 
plained: 
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on failure to raise via- 
ble issues, the district court must examine the trial court record to determine 
whether appellate counsel failed to present significant and obvious issues on appeal. 
Significant issues which could have been raised should then be compared to those 
which were raised. Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than 
those presented, "will" the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be over- 
come. 
Gray, 800 F.2d at 646. This standard would avoid the problem of habeas corpus review of 
claims of ineffectiveness of state appellate counsel. It may well be that a federal court will 
reach a different conclusion on the merits of an unraised state law claim than would a state 
appellate court considering that same claim on appeal. Thus, meritorious state law claims 
would never be entertained because of the federal court's perception 'of its strength. That 
sort of federal interference in state law proceedings should be avoided. 
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Again, as with the duty to protect access to appeal and,the duty to 
effectively perfect the appeal, there is no reason for appellate defer- 
ence. All of the reasons for non-deferential review discussed above 
with respect to appellate counsel's other duties apply here. Whether a 
defendant-appellant has retained his lawyer or had a lawyer assigned to 
him, he has little role in selecting the issues in practice.268 And under 
Jones v. Barr~es:~~ indigent clients who are assigned counsel have no 
constitutional right to decide which issues should be raised.270 
Finally, the assertion that an appellate court's independent review 
of the record ought to result in a relaxed performance standard for ap- 
pellate counsel has properly been rejected in several contexts. Most 
fundamentally, the Supreme Court in Anders v. CaliJornid7' ex- 
plained that once an appellate court finds nonfrivolous issues on appeal 
it must appoint an attorney.272 Later, in Evitts v. L u ~ e y ; ~ ~  the Court 
acknowledged: 
In bringing an appeal as of right from his conviction, a criminal defendant 
is attempting to  demonstrate that the conviction, with its consequent drastic 
loss of  liberty, is unlawful. To prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant 
must face an adversary proceeding that - like a trial - is governed by 
intricate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding. An 
unrepresented appellant - like an unrepresented defendant at trial - is 
unable to protect the vital interests at stake.274 
268. It is certainly almost impossible to imagine any case in which a client would 
request that an issue identified by his lawyer not be raised. 
269. 463 U.S. 745 (1983). 
270. Id. at 751. 
271. 386 U.S. 738 (1966). 
272. Id. at 744. 
273. 469 U.S. 387 (1985). 
274. Id. at 395. See also Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1985), where 
the court found coimsel's representation on appeal in a death penalty case to be ineffective. 
There, the court stated: 
It is true that we have imposed upon ourselves the duty to independently examine 
each death penalty case. However, we will be the first to agree that our judicially 
neutral review of so many death cases, many with records running to the thousands 
of pages, is no substitute for the carefil, partisan scrutiny of a zealous advocate. It 
is the unique role of that advocate to discover and highlight possible error and to 
present it to the court, both in writing and orally, in such a manner designed to 
persuade the court of the gravity of the alleged deviations from due process. 
Wilson, 474 So. 2d at 1165. 
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Most recently, in Penson v. the Court held that a court's 
independent review of the record after counsel's motion to withdraw 
had been granted was not sufficient to focus the court's attention on 
the arguable claims, even though the court's review included the briefs 
filed by the co-defendants and actually resulted in reversal in part of 
the defendant's conviction.276 In so holding, the Court stated: 
The need for forceful advocacy does not come to an abrupt halt as the 
legal proceeding moves from the trial to appellate stage. Both stages of 
the prosecution, although perhaps involving unique legal skills, require 
careful advocacy to ensure that rights are not forgone and that substantial 
legal and factual arguments are not inadvertently passed over . . . . [T'Jhe 
fundamental importance of the assistance of counsel does not cease as the 
prosecutorial process moves from the trial to the appellate stage . . . . 277 
B. No Prejudice Requirement 
Our major departure fiom the Strickland standard is the rejection 
of a requirement of prejudice. There is simply no justification for a 
separate prejudice requirement in evaluating ineffectiveness of appellate 
counsel claims. 
First, as previously discussed,27' requiring an independent show- 
ing of prejudice alters the evaluation of the attorney's performance by 
"importing into the assessment of competency the 'reasonable 
probability' language of the prejudice inquiry.'"79 Also, as noted 
above, the question of reasonable competence depends largely on 
275. 488 U.S. 75 (1988). 
276. Id. at 89. 
277. Id. at 85, 88. The Eleventh Circuit has also noted: 
A brief sets forth a partisan position and contains legal reasoning and authority 
supporting the defendant's position. The mere fact that appellate courts are obligat- 
ed to review the record for errors cannot be considered a substitute for the legal 
reasoning and authority typically found in a brief. 
Mylar v. Alabama, 671 F.2d 1299, 1302 (1 lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 
(1983). 
278. See supra text accompanying notes 187-97. 
279. Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d at 810 (Newrnan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 187- 
97 and accompanying text 
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whether an ignored issue had sufficient merit, in light of the other 
available issues, so that reasonably competent counsel would have 
pursued it.*'' The presence of an actual prejudice requirement distorts 
the evaluatio~i of performance so that the standard is no longer 
Strickland's "reasonable competence.'"'' 
Moreover, when ineffectiveness of state appellate counsel is litigat- 
ed on federal habeas corpus, the presence of a "reasonable probability" 
of success requirement requires a federal habeas court to second guess 
or predict the outcome of state issues allegedly omitted by state appel- 
late counsel, allowing too much federal intrusion into the state 
TO the extent that ineffectiveness of appellate counsel 
claims are litigated on direct appeal or by motion in an appellate court, 
the "reasonable probability" of success standard is at least unnecessary, 
because the appellate court considering the claim is present to resolve 
the issues on appeal. The concept of "reasonable probability" of a 
different result makes sense only when a reviewing court is trying to 
determine the effect of attorney incompetence on a jury that is no 
longer available. There is no need to engage in this type of probability 
analysis when one appellate panel of a given court is determining the 
effect of attorney incompetence on another of its panels. Moreover, as 
discussed abo~e,2'~ many claims of ineffectiveness based on failure to 
raise an issue are presented on habeas corpus. There, the federal court 
must determine de novo the merits of state law issues, an intrusive 
practice that clearly runs counter to the Court's current conception of 
federali~rn.~'~ 
280. See discussion supra Part IILC.3. 
281. As Judge Newman stated: 
Since Strickland used "reasonable probability" to measure the likelihood that a trial 
outcome would have been different (in order to assess prejudice from lawyering 
already determined to be deficient) it is ill-advised to press this same standard into 
service for the different task of determining whether counsel's performance was 
deficient. 
Claudio, 982 F.2d at 810 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
282. See supra notes 198-203. 
283. See supra notes 198-203. 
284. Again, in the words of Judge Newman: 
By invoking in the appellate context the "reasonable probability of affecting the 
outcome" standard from the trial context, the majority creates the risk, no doubt 
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The adjudication of a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel is 
also more burdensome and expensive than adjudication of a claim of 
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. Largely because it is so fact-bound 
and involves so many decisions that are presumptively strategic, chal- 
lenges to the effectiveness of trial counsel are held in a trial level 
forum, require hearings and findings of fact to determine what counsel 
knew, what facts he relied on, and what the client told him. Such 
proceedings can be extensive and costly. 
In contrast, constitutional claims of ineffectiveness of appellate 
counsel are generally litigated on federal habeas corpus285 and gener- 
ally do not involve hearings.286 If a hearing is required, it is likely to 
be relatively brief and to involve relatively clean-cut issues. 
The remedy for denial of effective assistance of appellate counsel 
- a new appeal - has a much less substantial effect on the finality 
of judgments than the remedy for denial of effective assistance of trial 
counsel - a new trial. Much of the reluctance to vacate a jury verdict 
that underlies the "reasonable probability" standard stems in large mea- 
sure from the expensive and burdensome result - a new trial. A find- 
ing of appellate ineffectiveness requires no more than an additional 
brief, and generally not even that. Most applications for relief based on 
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel are accompanied by precisely the 
inadvertently, that some defendants will be denied an opportunity to have presented 
to state courts some state law issues that reasonably competent counsel would have 
asserted and that might, after issuance of a conditional writ, prove successfil in 
state court, but that might not be thought by a federal habeas court to have a 
"reasonable probability of affecting the outcome." In other words, appellate counsel 
might, in some instances, be found to have performed below the level of reason- 
able competence, even though the habeas court is not persuaded that the omitted 
issue is a likely winner. In a case like the pending one, where the omitted claim 
is based on state law, the test should be simply whether the claim had sufficient 
merit, in view of the other available issues, that reasonably competent counsel 
would pursue it; the habeas court's prediction that the state law claim would prob- 
ably be meritorious in state court is wholly unnecessary and, indeed, inappropriate 
for a federal court. 
Claudio, 982 F.2d at 810. 
285. See, e.g., Schwander v. Blackbum, 750 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985); Bransford v. 
Brown, 806 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1986); Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125 (11th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 116 (1991). 
286. See supra notes 235-40. 
Heinonline - -  97 W. Va. L. Rev. 49 1994-1995 
50 WEST VIRGIN. LAW RE VIEW pol .  97:l 
kind of brief that properly should have been filed initially.287 Indeed, 
it is hard to imagine how such an application could succeed without 
the applicant pointing out precisely what issues should have been raised 
or precisely how an effective brief would have been written. To the 
extent that this practice is not followed in a given court, it could be 
required by local rule or case law, as it has been in the Anders con- 
text.288 
Finally, our proposed standard would not open the floodgates of 
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims. The re-defined reasonable 
competence test by definition reflects what most appellate attorneys al- 
ready do. Strategic decisions, properly and reasonably made, will con- 
tinue to be upheld. And the absence of a prejudice requirement will 
both return .the habeas courts to their proper, lessz intrusive role and 
restore the "reasonableness" to Strickland's reasonable competence 
standard as applied in the appellate context. Finally, to the extent that 
any additional claims do result, the quick and efficient resolution of 
such claims should not impose a substantial burden on the courts. 
VI. . CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has yet to articulate the standard for judging 
claims of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. In that vacuum, the 
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted the standard set 
forth in Strickland v. Washington289 for judging claims of ineffective- 
ness of trial counsel. All but one of the courts of appeals adopted 
Strickland without discussion or analysis.290 The only articulated rea- 
287. Gray,XOO F.2d at 646. In Gray, the court advised that: 
m h e  determination of whether the decision [not to raise certain issues on appeal] 
was strategic requires an examination of the trial record. In conducting such an 
examination, the district court should be guided by defendant's careful presentation 
of those issues which allegedly should have been raised on appeal, with accompa- 
nying citations to the trial record. 
Id 
288. IST CIF, R. 46.4(~); 2D CIR. R. 4(B); 4TH CIR. L0.P. 46.2; 5TH CIR. APP. III(3); 
61-14 CIR. R. 12(D); 7TH CIR. R. 4; ~ T H  C~R. APP. II(II)(I); IOTH CIR. R. 46.4.2; 1 ITH CIR. 
R. 46-I(D). 
289. 466 U.!S. 668 (1984). 
290. See dis~:ussion supra Part 1II.B. 
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soning on the subject - fiom the Ninth Circuit - is both inadequate 
and wrong. The Supreme Court should define the standard for judging 
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims. In the process, it should 
state definitively whether its Sfrickland standard applies, and if so, how 
it applies. In doing so, the Court must identify the relevant differences 
between the role of trial counsel and the trial forum fiom the role of 
appellate counsel and the appellate forum. The Court must also analyze 
the fuil scope of the right to effective assistance of appellate counsel, 
including the constitutional, common la+ procedural, and practical 
issues discussed in this article. No court has yet taken either of these 
steps. As we have done here, the Court should provide a uniform stan- 
dard for judging ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims that adopts 
but redefines Strickland's "reasonable competence~~ standard to fit the 
role of appellate counsel and the appellate fonun, and that rejects 
Strickland s prejudice requirement. 
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